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In this paper we show that from a macro-economic point of view the realisation
of a European Monetary Union (EMU) may be a very rational decision of the
participating countries. Despite the fact that countries loose their instrument for
monetary policy we show, in a very general context, that in a non-cooperative world
it may happen that welfare in each country increases by the introduction of an
EMU. The analysis is performed in both a two and three country setting assuming
that the economics of the involved countries can be described by some simple static
reduced-form macro-economic models and that each country maximizes individual
welfare.
Keywords: European Monetary Union, Welfare optimization, Nash equilibrium.
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The rationale for an EMU is often critisized. Policymakers complain about the loss of
a domestic monetary policy instrument and of the associated ability to adjust exchange
rates. As Goodhart (1995) argues, the cost of losing the domestic monetary policy in-
strument will depend, in part, on the extent to which participating nations are likely to
suer asymmetric shocks and the extent to which scal policy can, and should, serve as
an alternative to the use of monetary policy to foster adjustments.
In this paper we show in a very general game-theoretic framework that the decision of
the loss of domestic monetary policy and come to an EMU may be very rational if one
assumes a view of the world in which noncooperative policymaking of macroeconomic
policies is more realistic than cooperative policymaking. For instance governments may
negotiate in an international context about abandoning old (or designing new) rules,
regulations or agreements if they believe it is protable to do so. In our game-theoretic
concept this simply implies that the noncooperative gains before the rule is implemented
should be mutually less than the noncooperative gains after implementing. In this pa-
per we will analyse an institutional change, such as the implementation of an EMU, in
the same way. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to provide new insights to the
current literature of international cooperation, for a recent overview see Bryant (1995),
in at least two ways:
(1) We give a new, as we believe, interpretation of the EMU-concept in stage three. We
assume in an EMU that the objective of the independent EMU authorities is in one sense
a cooperative one, i.e., its primary goal is to help the participating countries in realizing
their objectives, but, due to its independent status, we assume that the game actually
played between the participating countries and the EMU authorities is a noncooperative
one.
(2) Under the assumption that the policy multipliers in the reduced form setup do not
change after the introduction of an EMU we show that the realization of EMU depends
crucially on the sign, size and the interrelationship of the various policy spillovers and
the asymmetries among the participating economies.
To make our point in the simplest way, but there is no loss of generality in this choice,
we start our analysis with a two-country model, each having a single policy target and
two policy instruments. We assume that for each country the economy can be described
by a reduced-form static expression which includes both domestic and foreign monetary
and scal policy, and an exogenous term representing the rest-of-the-world variables.
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Moreover, we consider for both countries a standard quadratic social loss function. Un-
der a regime of insular policymaking, each policymaker takes the policies of the other as
given and tries to reach its targets. This results in a Nash equilibrium strategy for their
policies and corresponding social losses. This situation is compared with the case that
both countries agree upon to form an EMU. That is, a situation in which both the econ-
omy and social loss functions of the countries are described by the same equations, but
monetary policy is delegated to an independent EMU authority. Now, on the one hand
the EMU authority sets monetary policy taking into account the welfare loss functions of
the individual countries. On the other hand we model the independency of the EMU by
assuming that it, like the individual countries, takes the (scal) policies of the individual
countries as given and tries to reach its target given these xed policies. Consequently,
the equilibrium policy strategies are in this case obtained as the Nash solution of a three
person game. For this situation, the corresponding welfare-loss function of each country
is compared with the outcome in the non-EMU case.
Two specic situations are analyzed theoretically in more detail. The rst case is that
one country is relatively small compared to the other. We will show that in that case
the large country will never gain by participating in an EMU. The second case studies
two symmetric countries. One clear result which holds in this case is that if monetary
policy is beggar-thy-neighbor and scal policy is locomotive, then both countries gain by
participation in an EMU. Thus in that case the introduction of an EMU may be a rather
rational decision. In a simulation we will show that in general the decision to come to
an EMU is a rather ambiguous one which critically depends on the model parameters
and on the existing asymmetries.
Since we found that in a two-country model, where one country is relatively small com-
pared to the other, one can hardly expect that an EMU will be realised, the question
arises what will happen if this model is extended by an additional large country. We
analyse this question in a separate section. Intuitively one would expect that since two
large countries are involved now, who may gain under some conditions from the intro-
duction of a \bilateral" EMU, a small country joining these two in the EMU will in
general be no problem for them. We will see that this intuition is correct, given that
some parametric conditions are satised.
The organization of the paper is as follows. First, in section two we present the basic
two-country model we will be dealing with in this paper. Then, in sections three and four
we will analyze the model outcomes under a small country and symmetric country as-
sumption, respectively. In section ve we present some simulation results for the general
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model for a number of calibrated parameter choices. Section six treats the three-country
model case and, nally, section seven contains some concluding remarks.
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2 The two-country model
Consider two countries, which economies are represented by the following reduced-form
model:
y = 1g + 2m+ 3g
 + 4m
 + c (1a)
y = 1g + 2m+ 3g
 + 4m
 + c (1b)
where each country is having a single policy target, y, which for example represents out-
put and two policy instruments, g, the scal instrument and, m, the monetary instru-
ment. In order to make a fair comparison with the EMU situation, as we will introduce
further down, we will consider all variables in growth rates. c represents unmodeled
phenomena including the inuence of the rest-of-the world.
Next, assume that the social welfare loss functions are represented by
J = (y   y)2 + g2 +m2 (2a)





Here y and y can be viewed as a target for domestic and foreign output, respectively.
Note that by including the unmodeled phenomena c and c into these targets we may
assume, without loss of generality, that c = c = 0 in (1).
Model-formulations in the literature concentrate mostly on frameworks with only one
policy instrument and one (or more) policy targets. For example skipping the scal
policy instrument in our formulation would resemble the model used by Canzoneri and
Gray (1985) in their study of monetary policy games. The same stylized models are
used by Ghosh and Masson (1994) and Hughes Hallett (1993). The latter shows that
this reduced-form structure also ts in the framework commonly used in the central
bank literature, such as Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and Rogo (1985). In comparison
with theoretical central bank studies which focus primarily on monetary policy (see e.g.
Broadbent and Barro (1995) en Morales and Padilla (1994)) the inclusion of a scal
policy instruments is of major importance here. Not only is it clear that there is an
intimate connection between monetary and scal policy in the sense that each policy
must be analyzed and chosen with the other in mind (see Leeper (1993)) but also it
shows to which extent scal policy will change in an EMU context.
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In the literature there is some ambiguity about the inclusion of policy instruments in the
welfare loss functions. For example Hughes Hallett (1993) includes policy instruments
in the welfare loss functions whereas many others do not. One reason may be that the
normalization of the desired targets for scal and monetary policy in both countries
towards zero is no restriction and therefore g and m are sometimes also described as
deviations from their desired paths. In our model, containing a single target and two
instruments, the inclusion of policy instruments in the welfare loss functions is useful
since it yields unique non-cooperative strategies. We show this aspect in appendix 1.
Including some weights in the welfare loss functions for scal and monetary policy would
yield a somewhat more general framework. This, however, at the expense of introducing
more parameters which intricates the analytical tractability and it does not yield much
more insight in most of the points we want to show.
As already indicated in the introduction, we assume that both countries are just inter-
ested in the minimization of their welfare-loss function and they set their policy instru-
ments, i.e. scal and monetary policy, independent of eachother. This Nash equilibrium
gives rise to the following unique policies, provided that the parameter det (see (4))
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Note that from these formulas it follows in particular that the equilibrium strategies










2 , respectively. Substitution of
these equilibrium strategies into the welfare-loss functions (2) yields then the following
equilibrium values (see again appendix 1), respectively:
7
J e =
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Next, consider the situation that both countries agree on an institutional change and
form an EMU. That is, they agree that henceforth de facto both countries use the same
currency and that monetary policy is determined by the independent EMU authority.
Since in the EMU situation we have one growth rate for money we may replace m and
m by the new monetary instrument m0. When setting this monetary instrument we
assume that the EMU authority strives for minimizing a weighted sum of the welfare-
loss functions of both countries. This gives rise to the following model:
The economies (1) of both countries are described under this institutional change by:
y = 1g + (2 + 4)m
0 + 3g
 (6a)
y = 1g + (2 + 4)m
0 + 3g
 (6b)
where m0 is the monetary instrument determined by the EMU authority. Remark that
we implicitly assume that this institutional change does not aect the reduced form
policy multipliers. This is a somewhat heroic assumption since an institutional change is
likely to alter the impact of these multipliers as well. For our game-theoretical analysis,
however, this assumption is the most plausible one since this enables us to make a fair
comparison between the two regimes. The welfare-loss functions for both countries are
again given by (2) and the welfare-loss function the EMU likes to minimize is given by
wJ + (1  w)J; (7)
where 0  w  1 is a weight parameter which is set by the EMU-authority. Hence, in
this formulation the loss of individual monetary policy is, partly, compensated by the
\coordination" instrument w of the EMU-authority.
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Note that the assumptions on the welfare-loss functions are crucial for the rest of our
analysis. By our rst assumption that these loss functions remain the same for both
countries under the \EMU regime", we express the belief that on the one hand feelings
regarding welfare-loss of people is indierent for the fact who is responsible for setting
policy instruments, and on the other hand that costs involved of maintaining EMU weigh
out the costs involved of performing an own monetary policy. Our second assumption
expresses the belief that the EMU as an independent authority has no individual goals,
that is, we assume that for performing monetary policy it only takes into considera-
tion the interests of the participating countries. As mentioned in the introduction, we
consider a Nash equilibrium among the three players. However, within this Nash equi-
librium there is some room for \coordination" by the EMU authority which is modelled
by weight parameter w. In this context we deliberately do not speak about a central
bank which primary focus is price stability. This remains an interesting topic for future
research where one may consider a multi-target framework in which tradeos between
ination and growth have to be studied. Independence in our framework is related to the
\coordination" parameter w. We assume that it will be set by the independent EMU-
authority, but one could also imagine situations where w is determined by a bargaining
process between the Member States.
In an equilibrium situation this yields then the following unique policies (see appendix 2)
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where
det2 := (1 + 
2
1 + w(2 + 4)
2)(1 + 23 + (1   w)(2 + 4)
2) 
(11 + w(2 + 4)(2 + 4))(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3 + (1  w)(2 + 4)(2 + 4)) (9)
9
Note that both in the non-EMU and the EMU case the equilibrium strategies of both
countries do not take into account the direct eect their policies have on the other
country. That is, in as well e.g. (3a,b) as (8a) we have that the scal instrument (and
monetary instrument in the non-EMU case) is only inuenced by the model parameter
1 (and 2 in the non-EMU case) via the determinant, which is a factor that equally
inuences all equilibrium strategies. Moreover, we observe that the equilibrium strategies
(8) in the EMU-case depend in an inverse way on the weight the EMU-authority attaches
to their welfare-loss function. That is, if the EMU-authority attaches a weight w to the
welfare-loss function of the domestic country then e.g., apart from the determinant (see
remark above), the parameter 2 + 4 only occurs with a weight 1  w in (8a).
Substitution of these equilibrium strategies (8) into the welfare-loss functions (2) yields





(1 + 21)[(1 + (1  w)(2 + 4)
2 + 23)y 
((1  w)(2 + 4)(2 + 4) + 33)y
]2 +
[(w(2 + 4)(1 + 
2
3)  (1  w)11(2 + 4))y +
((1  w)(1 + 21)(2 + 4)  w(2 + 4)33)y
]2 g (10a)




















(1 + 23)[(11 + w(2 + 4)(2 + 4))y 
(1 + 21 + w(2 + 4)
2)y]2 +
[(w(2 + 4)(1 + 
2
3)  (1  w)11(2 + 4))y +
((1  w)(1 + 21)(2 + 4)  w(2 + 4)33)y
]2 g (10b)















Now, consider equations (5) and (10).
In the sequel we will denote the dierence between the equilibrium outcomes J eEMU and
J e by J , i.e. J := J eEMU   J






The following denition makes now sense:
Denition 1:
We call an EMU between both countries realizable for a given parameter set i, i
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(i = 1; : : : ; 4), w and target values y and y if both J and J are nonpositive. 2
In other words, we call the EMU realizable if both countries would not lose (in terms of
welfare) from its introduction. The rest of the paper will be dealing with the question
under which conditions on the parameters and targets EMU is realizable. As announced
in the introduction, to deal with this question we take two approaches. First we will make
some simplifying assumptions on the parameters, which enhance an analytic treatment
of this problem. Second, we will perform a simulation study. That is, we will calculate
for a number of \realistic" parameters and targets whether the EMU is realizable.
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3 Realizability of EMU under a \small country"
assumption
In this section we assume that the home country is relatively small compared to the
foreign country. This is expressed by taking 1 = 2 = 0 in both (1b) and (6b). Substi-
tution of these parameter values into (5) and (10) yields then the following equilibrium
welfare-loss functions for the non-EMU and EMU case, respectively:
J e :=
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5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and we used 5 to denote 2 + 4.
Note from det and det2, respectively, that for the non-EMU case always an equilibrium
exists, whereas this need not to be the case for the EMU situation. Now, under the














































The above equality can e.g. be obtained by spelling out both sides of the equality and
comparing terms. This is a straightforward, though rather lengthy job, that gives not
much insight and which we therefore omit.
From (11), we immediately see that J  0. This observation leads directly to the
conclusion:
Theorem 2:
Under a small country assumption almost never an EMU will be realized. This, since
the large country is almost always confronted with a welfare-loss if an EMU is established.
Note that the only case under which an EMU might be realized is if the last expression
in (11) between square brackets is zero. In that case we would have J = 0.
The example is an extreme case and, therefore, the intuition behind the result is obvious.
Since in the non-EMU case the foreign (strong) country is not interdependent with the
home (weak) country it can follow an independent policy which guarantees the strong
country the smallest possible welfare loss. Hence, in the EMU-case interdependence is
accomplished through the EMU-authority which may decrease welfare for the stronger
country.
One could also argue that in this context the assumption that the players play a Nash-
equilibrium is maybe not the most realistic one, and that a Stackelberg-equilibriummay
be a more appropriate one. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and left as
a problem for future research.
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4 Realizability of EMU under a \symmetric coun-
try" assumption
We now consider the case that the economies of both countries are similar. This is
expressed by taking 1 = 3, 2 = 4, 3 = 1, 4 = 2 and y = y
 in (1) and (6). For
analytical purposes we will, moreover, assume that 3 = 11 and 4 = 22. Note that
in economic models usually jij  1; i = 1; 2. We will make therefore this assumption
throughout the rest of this section.
This results in the following model for the economies in the non-EMU situation:
y = 1g + 2m+ 11g
 + 22m

y = 11g + 22m+ 1g
 + 2m
 (12)
From (5) we have that the corresponding equilibrium welfare loss functions are:
J e = J
e
:=
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Similarly, we obtain for the EMU case:
y = 1g + 2(1 + 2)m
0 + 11g
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Note from these expressions that we can rewrite the welfare-loss functions as
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Furthermore, note that due to the symmetry assumption the equilibrium welfare-loss
functions in the EMU case become independent of w. From these expressions we obtain
the following result:
Theorem 3:
Under a \symmetric country" assumption and the additional assumptions that an ex-
pansionary monetary policy has a negative inuence on foreign output (i.e. 2 < 0) and
that an expansionary scal policy has positive eect on foreign output (i.e. 1 > 0), an
EMU is realizable.
Intuitively, this result makes sense. Since in a situation where 2 < 0, a monetary
expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, and where 1 > 0, a scal expansion is a
locomotive policy, it is better to let an independent EMU authority, who considers the
interests of both countries, decide on the impact of the beggar-they-neighbour policies.
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222 + 1)]; (15)
where the last equality can be veried by a lengthy comparison of terms on both sides
of the equality sign. Introducing
s := [(1 + 1)((1   1)2 + 21)
4






1   2((2 + 1)
222 + 1)]; (16)
we see from (15) that the sign of J equals minus the sign of s. Given, furthermore,




5 A simulation study
For a better understanding of the theoretical results we perform in this section a sim-
ulation analysis. We will concentrate on the analysis of the realizability of EMU in
a \symmetric country" model on which we will perform some asymmetric shocks. As
we have already noticed, the outcome of the game depends strongly on the parame-
ter choices determining the spillovers in the reduced form model. In the literature for
multi-country studies there is still a debate about the direction and strength of interna-
tional spillovers. For example, Bryant et al. (1990) and Frankel(1995) show, by using a
range of macroeconomic world-models, that there is little empirical consensus on the size
and the sign of various spillovers. Also Whitley (1992) nds that in models describing
the European economy spillover eects to other European economies, originating from a
single-country European expansion, are negligible. Douven and Plasmans (1996) express
their beliefs that these ndings are merely a result of the modelling strategies used and
that in practice the size of these spillovers may be considerably larger than advocated
by these models. In order to cope with these dierent ndings, we will consider a wide
range of possible parameter choices for the various spillovers and thus leave this debate
undecided.
Another important aspect for our conclusions is the \symmetric" assumption. As shown
by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) shocks across EU-regions can be rather asymmet-
ric, therefore, we will present some examples how the two dierent regimes respond to
asymmetric shocks.
Consider again the symmetric framework in (12). In order to keep the simulation
tractable, we assume that 1 = 2 = 1, which reects the fact that a government is
indierent in using a scal or monetary instrument for expanding output. The elasticity
choice of 1 turns out to be just a scaling choice since we are only interested in the relative
performance of the two regimes. Furthermore, we consider  0:5 < i < 0:5; i = 1; 2;
which is likely to cover the wide range of empirical outcomes found by most multi-country
studies. The choice for y; y is arbitrary and the qualitative results are insensitive to the
size of it, as long as we stay \symmetric". We started with a choice of 3, which reects a
3% growth rate in output. We deviated from the \symmetric" assumption by simulating
dierent values for y. This dierence may not only reect a dierent desired value for
output in the rst country but may also reect the fact that the two countries are hit
by dierent external shocks (represented by c and c in the reduced-form model (1) in
section two). This can be easily seen by bringing c to the left hand side in equation
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(1a). Substitution of y   c in the rst term in (2a) yields then (y   (y + c))2. The
simulation comparison results of the two regimes are presented in gure 1. The four
diagrams in gure 1 represent dierent asymmetric shocks, using dierent values for c.
Each symbol in the diagrams represents a certain choice for (1; 2) and c. The symbols
are characterised as follows:
- + indicates that an EMU is realizable
-  indicates that both countries are worse o under an EMU.
-  only country one (home) gains under an EMU.
-  only country two (foreign) gains under an EMU.
Note that in our calculations for each pair of (1; 2) we had to calculate the optimal
















































diag. 4: asymmetric case: c=-0.6
Figure 1: Asymmetric shocks under a \symmetric country" assumption
First we searched for values for which an EMU is realizable and if this was not found
we searched for a value where at least one country was better o. Remark, that we
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did not nd a situation in which an EMU was not realizable but there was a w for
which only country one was better o and there was another w for which only country
two was better o. The rst diagram represents the symmetric case in which there is
no shock and we see that for 1 > 0; 2 < 0 (a scal expansion is locomotive and a
monetary expansion is beggar thy neighbour) that both countries are better o under
an EMU. The mirror image (2 < 0; 1 > 0) is also favourable but this depends on our
particular choice 1 = 2 = 1: Under this assumption it easy to show that s < 0 in (16).
Regarding EMU, unfavourable outcomes can be found in the area where the sign of the
scal spillover eect equals the sign of the monetary spillover eect, but is larger in size.
Diagrams 2-4 in gure 1 show that the symmetric assumption is an important one since
a small external shock in one of the countries can already trouble the outcome. In
diagrams 2-4, we only decreased the value of c, from zero to -0.2, -0.4 to -0.6, suggesting
an increasing negative external shock in the home country. We observe that as the size
of the shock (or dierences in preferences) increases not only the EMU realizability area
vanishes but the amount of 's vanishes as well. In general, as one can see from the
diagrams, in the asymmetric cases it depends on the size and sign of the spillovers and
the shock implied, which country gains under an EMU and which country not.
19
6 The three-country model
In the stylized models of sections 3 and 4 we saw that the realizability of an EMU
depends in particular on the size of both countries. If one of the countries is relatively
small, an EMU will not be realized; if they are similar, the realizability depends on the
specic model parameters.
Given this observation, the question arises what will happen in a three-country model
where one country is relatively small and the other two are symmetric (in the sense of
section 4). As we saw in section 3 in a two-country model the realization of an EMU is
blocked, under a small country assumption, since the large country does not gain from
its realization. Given this observation and the fact that in the symmetric case an EMU
may be realizable, one would expect that in a three-country model the small country
may be sucked in an EMU realization of the two symmetric countries. This observation
is also made by Alesina and Grilli (1993) where they express some skepticism on the
idea of a \multi-speed" union. They argue that once, for example in our model, the two
large countries form a restricted union they will never agree to enlarge the union, on a
later date, with a small country, whereas an EMU would be feasible at \one speed". To
analyze this aspect we consider the following model:
The economies of the three countries in the non-EMU case are described by (see (12))
y = 1g + 2m+ 11g
 + 22m

y = 11g + 22m+ 1g
 + 2m

ys = 1g + 2m+ 3g
 + 4m
 + 5gs + 6ms; (17)
where, ys, gs and ms denote output, scal and monetary policy of the small country and
we assume, to simplify the analyses, that both 1 and 5 dier from zero. The welfare-




where ys is the output target for the small country. Under the assumption, again, that
every country is just interested in the minimization of its own welfare-loss function, we
obtain in an equilibrium situation (under the regularity condition that the parameter
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s;3. This yields the equilibrium welfare-loss functions (see
also (13)):
J e = J
e
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Next, consider the case that the three countries form an EMU and the EMU's goal is to
minimize a weighted sum of the welfare-loss functions, i.e. JEMU := w1J + w2J
 + w3Js
with w1 + w2 + w3 = 1. Introducing 5 := 2(1 + 2) and 7 := 2 + 4 + 6 we obtain
from (17) the following model equations:
y = 1g + 5m
0 + 11g

y = 11g + 5m
0 + 1g

ys = 1g + 7m
0 + 3g
 + 5gs
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2
1)[(1 + (1 + 1)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1)w3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(1 + (1   1)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7) + 5(55(1  w3) + w3137(1   5)))ys  
1(13 + (1   w3)57   w311
2




det3 = (1 + (1  1)
2











5)(w3137 + (w3   1)5) + w3117(1   35))];
and the corresponding welfare-loss functions:

























From (19a), (21a) we immediately observe that if the large countries have already reached
their target output before \the game" starts, i.e. y = 0, then almost never an EMU will
be realized if the small country has not yet reached its target output too, i.e. ys 6= 0.
This, irrespective of the fact whether the parameter 2 < 0. So, our rst conclusion is
that there exist situations where the inclusion of a small country into the EMU negoti-
ation process may block the realization of an EMU between two symmetric countries.
On the other hand, the converse situation can also occur. The four player game is
however rather complex. Therefore we will concentrate on some simulation results and
discuss also the impact of the EMU authority through their \coordination" parameter
w, since we believe that this is an interesting new aspect in these type of models.
The simulations in gure 2 represent the following parameter choices in (17). As in our
22
rst simulation we used 1 = 2 = 1,  0:5 < 1; 2 < 0:5, y = y
 = 3. For the small
country we have chosen the following values: ys = 3, 1 = 3 = 11, 2 = 4 = 22
and 5 = 6 = 0:2. As in the previous simulation every symbol in the gure represents a
certain combination (1; 2) and for each successive diagram in the gure we enlarged the
coordination search of the EMU- authority. The symbols are characterised as follows:
- + indicates that an EMU is realizable
-  indicates that all three countries are worse o under an EMU.
-  indicates that (only) the small country gains under an EMU.
-  indicates that (only) the two large countries gain under an EMU
Furthermore, the parameter weight, in the caption of each diagram, is described as








weight. So, by enlarging for each successive
diagram the w1; w2; w3 space, the EMU authority may nd better game outcomes. As
one can see, sometimes the symbols ,  appear for the same (1; 2) combination. for
such a combination an \all three win" situation is not available and thus has the EMU-
authority to choose for either the two large countries or the small country. As expected
the 's vanish and the number of +'s increases as the coordination space is enlarged. The
main point we want to show is, however, that in general it is very hard to draw certain
conclusions on questions like: "Who is better o?". In this example we nd again some
evidence that if the EMU authority picks out the right \coordination" policy an EMU

















































diag. 4:  0.05<weight<0.95




In this paper we showed in a theoretical framework that from a welfare optimization point
of view the decision of countries to form an EMU may be very rational in the context of
a noncooperative world. The analysis was based on an elementary reduced form macro-
economic model. In a two country model setting we derived analytic expressions for the
optimal welfare functions of both countries in both the situations that they agree to form
an EMU and not. In an EMU-situation we assume that the EMU-authority controls
monetary policy and optimizes a weighted sum of the individual welfare functions of
EU-countries but we assume that the actual game among the EU-countries and the
EU-authority is played in a non-cooperative mode. We believe that this formulation
makes more sense than cooperative frameworks where it is assumed that, in order to
exploit international interdependencies positively, countries commit themselves to play
an \unstable" Pareto ecient outcome. By comparing these welfare functions for the
dierent regimes we saw that it may happen that in an EMU-regime welfare increases for
both countries. We called an EMU realizable if this situation occurs. Two special cases
were analyzed in more detail. First, we showed that under a small country assumption an
EMU is almost never realizable. Second, we elaborated the problem under a symmetric
country assumption. One observation we made under this assumption was that an EMU
is realizable if monetary policy is beggar-thy-neighbour and scal policy is locomotive.
To see how far these conclusions also hold in a more general multi-country model setting,
we considered a three country model composed o two symmetric countries and one small
country. Again, we derived analytic formulas for the optimal welfare functions of the
three countries. In particular it turned out that the above mentioned observation we
made in the two symmetric country model framework does not carry over to this new
situation. We illustrated that the inclusion of a third small country into the symmetric
country framework may have as well a positive as a negative eect on the realizability
of an EMU. Concluding we could say that in our game-theoretic analysis we could not
nd much evidence that the loss of domestic monetary policy and moving to an EMU is
associated with costs for all countries. On the contrary, in several examples we showed
that even in a very simple reduced form framework the costs of moving to an EMU depend




Alesina A., and V. Grilli, On the feasibility of a one or multi-speed European Monetary
Union, NBER working paper no. 4350, Cambridge, 1993.
Bayoumi T. and B. Eichengreen, Shocking aspects of European Monetary Union, CEPR
discussion Paper no. 643, 1992.
Broadbent R.J. and R.J. Barro, Central bank preferences and macroeconomic equilib-
rium, Working Paper, Bank of England, May 1995.
Bryant R.C., International cooperation in the making of national macroeconomic poli-
cies: where do we stand?, in Kenen, P.B., editor, Understanding interdependence,
the macroeconomics of the open economy, Princeton University Press, Cambridge,
1995.
Bryant R.C., D. Henderson, G. Holtham, P. Hooper and S. Symanski, editors, Em-
pirical Macroeconomics for interdependent Economics, The Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C., 1990.
Canzoneri, M. and J.A. Gray, Monetary policy games and the consequences of nonco-
operative behaviour, International Economic Review 26, 1985, 547-564.
Douven, R.C. and J.E.J. Plasmans, SLIM a small linear interdependent model of eight
EU-Member States, USA and Japan, CentER Discussion Paper 94113, Tilburg
University, 1994. Forthcoming in Economic Modelling.
Frankel, J.A., Financial markets and monetary policy, The MIT press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1995.
Ghosh, A.R. and P.R. Masson, Economic Cooperation in an Uncertain World, Blackwell
Publishers, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1994.
Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands; EMS discipline and
central bank credibility, European Economic Review 32, 1988, 1055-1082.
Goodhart, C.A.E., The political economy of monetary union, in Kenen, P.B., editor,
Understanding interdependence, the macroeconomics of the open economy, Prince-
ton University Press, Cambridge, 1995.
Hughes Hallett, A.J., Exchange rates and asymmetric policy regimes: When does ex-
change rate targeting pay?, Oxford Economic Papers 45, 1993, 191-206.
Leeper, E.M., The policy tango: Towards a holistic view of monetary and scal eects,
Economic Review 78 (4), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1993.
26
Morales, A.J. and A.J. Padilla, Designing institutions for international monetary policy
coordination, Working paper, University College, London, December 1994.
Rogo, K., Can international monetary policy coordination be counter productive?,
Journal of International Economics 18, 1985, 199-217.
Whitley, J.D., Comparative simulation analysis of the European multi-country models,
Journal of Forecasting, 11:423-458, 1992.
27
Appendix 1
In this appendix we calculate the Nash solution for the two country model (1), (2).
The assumption that each country minimizes its own welfare-loss function w.r.t. its
policy instruments g and m, taking the eect of the other country for granted, yields the
following four conditions (obtained by dierentiating (2a) w.r.t. g and m, respectively,
and (2b) w.r.t. g and m, respectively):
(21 + 1)g + 12m+ 13g
 + 14m
 = 1y (1.1a)
12g + (
2
2 + 1)m+ 23g
 + 24m
 = 2y (1.1b)






14g + 24m+ 34g
 + (24 + 1)m
 = 4y
 (1.1d)
So, there exists a unique equilibrium strategy if and only if this set of equations has a




21 + 1 12 1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14
1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2
2 + 1 23 24
1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2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2
3 + 1 34


























we see that (1.1) can be rewritten as Au = b.
So a unique equilibrium exists if and only if the determinant of A, which we will denote
by det, diers from zero. The equilibrium strategies are then ue := A 1b, where A 1
denotes the inverse of matrix A.
Some straightforward, though lengthy, calculations show that






4)  (11 + 22)(33 + 44) (1.2)
which yields the uniqueness result as advertised in section 2. Note, that if we had skipped
the monetary and scal policy parameters, m and g, in both welfare functions then the
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determinant of A would be zero. So, in that case either no equilibrium strategy exists
or there exists more than one equilibrium strategy. .








































   4(11 + 22)y
1
CCCCCCA
satises (1.1a). Since in a similar way it can be shown that also (1.1b-1.1d) hold, we will
omit that part of the proof.
To prove that ue satises (1.1a) we rst note that me and ge satisfy 1m
e = 2g
e. Next,


























4)y   1(33 + 44)y
]+














4)  (11 + 22)(33 + 44)]y = 1  det y;
which shows the claim (since by assumption det 6= 0).
Finally, we consider the corresponding welfare-loss functions. We will only show the
correctness of the formula for J e, the correctness of the formula for J
e
is proved in a
similar way and is, therefore, skipped.
Note that, by substituting ue into (2a), J e can be rewritten as:
J e = ((1 2 3 4)u









f((1 2 3 4)u







4)y   (33 + 44)y
]2g:
Simple calculations show that
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(1 2 3 4)u
e  det   y  det =  (1 + 23 + 
2
4)y + (33 + 44)y
:










4)y   (33 + 44)y
]2;
which completes the proof.
Another, more elegant proof, in case 1 6= 0 of the above expression for J
e is obtained
by noting that
(1 2 3 4)u
e  det   y  det =
1
1
[1(1 2 3 4)u













which can be rewritten, using (1.1a), as   1
1
ge det.



































In this appendix we calculate the equilibrium strategies and corresponding welfare-loss
functions if the two countries agree to form an EMU. The both necessary and sucient
conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium strategy are, in this case, that the
following set of three equations has a unique solution for g, m0 and g. The equations are
obtained by dierentiation of (2a) w.r.t. g, (2b) w.r.t. g, and (7) w.r.t. m0, respectively.
Using 5 := 2 + 4 and 5 := 2 + 4, we get:
(21 + 1)g + 15m
0 + 13g
 = 1y (2.1a)
[w15 + (1  w)15]g + [w
2




+ [w35 + (1   w)35]g
 = w5y + (1  w)5y
 (2.1b)
13g + 35m







21 + 1 15 13
w15 + (1  w)15 w
2
5 + (1  w)
2























we obtain, similarly as in appendix 1, that a unique equilibrium strategy exists if and
only if the determinant of A0, denoted by det2, diers from zero.
Straightforward calculations show that






3 + (1  w)
2
5) 
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11 + w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33 + (1   w)5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satises (2.1). This can be shown by direct substitution of u0e into (2.1). We will only














3) + 15(w5(1 + 
2
3)  (1   w)115)
 133(w55 + 11)]y +


























5   (1   w)1155   33(w55 + 11)]y =
1[(
2
1 + 1 + w
2





(11 + w55)(33 + (1  w)55)]y = 1det2y;
which completes this part of the proof.
Next, consider the welfare-loss functions (2). Substitution of u0e into (2a) gives:
J eEMU := ((1 5 3)u












Now, (1 5 3)u
0e det2 y det2 =




3) + 5(w5(1 + 
2
3)  (1   w)115)
 33(w55 + 11)  det2]y +
[ 21((1   w)55 + 33) + 5((1  w)(1 + 
2







 [1 + 23 + (1  w)
2
5]y + [(1  w)55 + 33]y













which immediately the result follows stated in (10a).
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Note that, in case 1 6= 0, also a similar proof of this property like at the end of appendix
1 can be given.
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Appendix 3
In this appendix we calculate the equilibrium strategies and corresponding welfare-loss
functions for both the non-EMU and EMU case in the three country model. Similarly as
in the two previous appendices the both necessary and sucient conditions for existence
of an equilibrium strategy in the non-EMU case are obtained by dierentiation of J , J
and Js w.r.t. g, m, g
, m, gs and ms, respectively. This yields the four equations (1.1)
presented in appendix 1 together with the equations:
15g + 25m+ 35g
 + 45m
 + (25 + 1)gs + 65ms = 5ys (2.1)
and
16g + 26m+ 36g
 + 46m
 + 56gs + (
2
6 + 1)ms = 6ys (2.2)
As already shown in appendix 1 (though in a somewhat more general context), (18a-b)
satisfy the four equations (1.1).
We will next show that (18a-d) also satisfy (i). That (ii) is also satised by these
expressions can be shown in a similar way.
Using, the relationships ge = g
e






s, we have that
d  det [(1 + 3)5g
e + (2 + 4)5m





(1(1 + 3)5 + 2(2 + 4)5)d(1 + (1   1)
2
1 + (1   2)
2
2)y +
+(1 + 25 + 
2
6)5 det[ ((1 + 3)1 + (2 + 4)2)y +
+(1 + (1 + 1)
2
1 + (1 + 2)
2
2)ys] =
(d(1 + (1  1)
2
1 + (1   2)
2





(1(1 + 3)5 + 2(2 + 4)5)y +
(1 + (1 + 1)
2






6) det 5ys =
((1 + (1 + 1)
2
1 + (1 + 2)
2
2)(1 + (1  1)
2
1 + (1   2)
2
2)  det)
(1 + 25 + 
2
6)(1(1 + 3)5 + 2(2 + 4)5)y + d  det 5ys:
It is easily veried that det = (1 + (1 + 1)
2
1 + (1 + 2)
2
2)(1 + (1  1)
2
1 + (1  2)
2
2).
Using this in the above expression it follows then straightforwardly that (18a-d) satisfy
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(i). The correctness of the expression for the welfare-loss functions J and J (19a), fol-
lows directly from (13).
The correctness of (19b) can be proved analogous the proof for J e we gave at the end of
appendix 1.
Next, consider the EMU case.
Dierentiation of J , JEMU, J
 and Js w.r.t. g, m
0, g and gs, respectively, yields the
equations:
(1 + 21)g + 15m
0 + 211g
 = 1y






+(151w1 + 15w2 + 37w3)g
 + w357gs = (1  w3)5y + w37ys
211g + 15m




 + (1 + 25)gs = 5ys
Substitution of (20) shows that these variables satisfy the equations. In other words,
these are the equilibrium strategies.
A similar reasoning like at the end of appendix 1 shows then
J eEMU = J

e
EMU =
 
1
21
+ 1
!
ge
2
EMU;3 +m
0e2
EMU
and
J es;EMU =
 
1
25
+ 1
!
ge
2
s;EMU;3 +m
0e2
EMU
